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The Autonomy of Treaty Terms1
In accordance with the conception of the autonomy of treaty terms, an 
international body exercising monitoring functions should assign treaty 
terms specific meanings, irrespective of the meanings they have in the 
national law of particular State parties. 
International monitoring involves the comparison of a treaty norm 
establishing a given human right with a respective norm of national law. 
Both norms are often worded in a similar or identical manner. The iden-
tical or similar wording of a treaty norm and a corresponding national 
norm does not entail that meanings assigned to terms used in them are 
identical, however. This is due to the fact that they are interpreted by dif-
ferent bodies.2 The reasons for divergent interpretations are many. For 
instance, the general provisions of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights on the protection of minorities (Article 27) or on po-
litical rights (Article 25) are more susceptible to divergent interpretations 
than the detailed and precise provisions on the administration of justice 
(Article 14). Firstly, it must be remembered, however, that national law 
1 A. Michalska, Autonomiczność pojęć traktatowych, “Toruński Rocznik Praw Człowieka 
i Pokoju” 1993, 2 by Tomasz Żebrowski and proofread by Stephen Dersley and Ryszard 
Reisner. The translation and proofreading were financed by the Min istry of Science and 
Higher Education under 848/2/P-DUN/2018. 
2 V. P. Daranowski, Międzynarodowa ochrona praw obywatelskich i politycznych in statu 
nascendi. Międzynarodowy Pakt Praw Obywatelskich i Politycznych, Łódź 1993, p. 240. 
Author develops the theory of objective regime against the backdrop of the discussion of 
the autonomy of treaty terms.
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is enacted through reliance on specific philosophical, political and legal 
conceptions that determine what this law means and how it should be 
interpreted. Agreement on the content of international instruments is not 
underpinned by a common conception of human rights. Consequently, 
provisions on the freedom of speech or the freedom of association are 
considerably more often subject to divergent interpretations than, for 
example, provisions on personal freedom or a ban on torture. 
The autonomy of certain terms is sometimes provided for in treaties 
themselves. For instance, the provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights on the freedom of assembly and association (Arti-
cle 11(1)), by establishing the right to form and to join trade unions, 
pre-determine that the trade-union freedom is covered by this provi-
sion, regardless of whether trade unions are considered associations by 
national law. An analogous wording has been adopted by the drafters of 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in its Article 22(1). 
The decisions of international bodies monitoring how signatories imple-
ment human rights treaties show a rather clear tendency to assign the terms 
used in the treaties an autonomous meaning. In the decisions of the Human 
Right Committee, the tendency was first observed in relation to the applica-
tion of Sandra Lovelace v. Canada.3 The Committee took the position that 
it was necessary to differentiate between the protection of minorities pro-
vided for under the Indian Act and the international protection of minorities 
guaranteed under the Covenant, Article 27. As a result, the Committee held 
that in spite of the fact that the Indian Act guaranteed a number of rights and 
privileges for members of ethnic groups, there were no justifiable reasons 
for denying the author of the application the rights provided for in the Cov-
enant, Article 27. This decision is cited in an illustration of the thesis that 
“… the protection provided for under the Covenant is international protec-
tion which is to be distinguished from national standards of protection”.4
3 Communication no. 6/24, Rapport du Comité des Droits de l’Homme, Assemblée Générale, 
Documents Officiels, 1981.
4 B. G. Ramcharan, The Concept and Present Status of the International Protection of Hu-
man Rights, Dordrecht–Boston–London 1989, p. 31.
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In relation to the case of Gordon C. van Duzen v. Canada, the Hu-
man Rights Committee found that:
The Committee further notes that its interpretation and application of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has to be based on 
the principle that the terms and concepts of the Covenant are indepen-
dent of any particular national system of law and of all dictionary defini-
tions. Although the terms of the Covenant are derived from long traditions 
within many nations, the Committee must now regard them as having an 
autonomous meaning. 
The object of interpretation was the term “penalty” within the mean-
ing of the Covenant, Article 15(1). The question at issue was whether 
the term also covered “administrative” penalties. The Committee, opt-
ing for an extensive interpretation, stressed that it took into consider-
ation not only the literal wording of the relevant provision, but also its 
object and purpose.5 
The conception of the autonomy of treaty terms can also be easily 
found in the decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Human Rights. An example of this is pro-
vided by the interpretation of Article 11, mentioned previously, of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which establishes the freedom 
of assembly and association. Article 11 stipulates that political parties 
are treated as associations, regardless of whether they enjoy this status 
under national law. This position was taken by the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights in relation to the application by the German Com-
munist Party v. the Federal Republic of Germany, which questioned 
whether the decision to ban the party was compliant with the European 
Convention.6 P. van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof write that:
5 Communication no. 12/50, Rapport du Comité des Droits de l’Homme, Assemblée Gé-
nérale, Documents Officiels, 1982. 
6 Application no. 250/57, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1955–
1957, p. 222.
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An autonomous meaning should be assigned to the word “association”. 
The legal form chosen, and the legal consequences attached thereto by 
national law, cannot be decisive here, since otherwise the guarantee pro-
vided for in Article 11 would be illusory and the scope of the guarantee 
granted in particular State parties would differ.7 
This is not only a theoretical demand, but also a conclusion follow-
ing from a study of the decisions of European bodies. 
In the cases referred to above by way of example, international bod-
ies recognised the autonomy of the meanings of treaty terms vis-à-vis 
national law systems. A question arises, however, of whether national 
law is the only point of reference for assigning treaty terms autonomous 
meanings, or whether such a reference point is afforded also by other 
human rights treaties. In other words, is a given treaty to be interpreted 
as an autonomous instrument or as one of the elements in the interna-
tional system of human rights protection. It is by no means just a theo-
retical problem; on the contrary, it has arisen in relation to the varied 
practice of international bodies. 
European case law refers to treaties binding on the state-members of the 
Council of Europe and to both Human Rights Covenants and ILO Conven-
tions. For instance, the phrase “forced or compulsory labour” (European 
Convention, Article 4) was interpreted by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the light of the provisions of ILO Conventions nos. 29 and 105.8 
When interpreting trade-union freedom, European bodies have regularly 
referred to relevant ILO Conventions. For instance, the European Commis-
sion maintained—referring to ILO Convention no. 87—that the freedom of 
assembly and association guaranteed in Article 11 of the European Conven-
tion, meant that any form of intimidating employees to stop them from par-
7 P. van Dijk, G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Deventer–Boston 1990, p. 431.
8 Judgement of ECHR of 23 November 1983, Van der Mussel v. Belgium, European Court of 
Human Rights, Judgements and Decisions Series A, vol. 70, 1983, pp. 16–17. 
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ticipating in trade-union activity was a breach of this freedom.9 The Com-
mission took the position that the right to form trade unions included, inter 
alia, the right of unions to draw up their own rules and to make decisions 
on trade-union matters. These rights are explicitly recognised in ILO Con-
vention no. 87, which “must be taken into account in the present context”.10 
The most troublesome problem in the context of trade-union free-
dom was the right to strike. The organs of the European Convention 
recognised, admittedly, that strikes were an important means of protect-
ing trade union interests, but not the only one. The Court, invoking the 
European Social Charter, held that the right to strike—assuming that it 
is guaranteed under Article 11 of the European Convention —could be 
always restricted by national legislation.11 
The Human Rights Committee did not invoke—besides the last-
mentioned case—other international instruments. The Committee, how-
ever, heard many applications involving decisions on pensions, unem-
ployment benefits, and state subsidies to cover tuition in private schools, 
that is, ones whose subject matter went beyond the scope of the Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights. The authors of these applications 
alleged that the principle of equality before the law had been breached 
(Covenant, Article 26). 
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
states: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law”. The Committee has 
consistently held that this provision is not a repetition of the guarantees 
given in Article 2(1) that obligates State Parties to respect and ensure 
to all individuals “rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind…”. The Committee has held that Article 26 of 
9 X v. Ireland, Application no. 4125/69, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Vol. XVI, 1971, p. 198.
10 Cheall v. United Kingdom, Application no. 10550/83, Decisions and Reports of the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights, 1985, p. 185 
11 Judgement of ECHR of 6 February 1976, Schmidt & Dahlström v. Sweden, Judgement de-
livered by the Court on 6 February 1976, European Court of Human Rights Series A, vol. 21, 
1976, p. 16.
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the Covenant imposed a ban on “discrimination in all spheres that fall 
within the competence of state organs and not only in respect of rights 
provided for in the Covenant”. 
Characteristically, in cases alleging infringement of the Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 26, in relation to deci-
sions on social matters, the Committee did not invoke the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, whereas the parties to disputes 
did. It will be worthwhile to present here, by way of example, arguments 
given by individuals and States, and grounds for the Committee’s deci-
sion, as they have several interesting aspects. 
A female Dutch national, Broeks, alleged the infringement of Article 
26 of the Covenant by arguing that a decision of competent state organs 
to deprive her of an unemployment benefit was tantamount to discrimina-
tion by reason of sex. Under national legislation, a male in an identical 
personal and social situation is paid such a benefit. The ratio legis of these 
provisions was the fact that a male was held to be the main breadwinner. 
The State questioned the admissibility of ratione materiae appli-
cation by arguing that (a) the principle of non-discrimination in the 
area of social security and insurance is guaranteed in Articles 2 & 
3 (equality of rights) and Article 9 (right to insurance) of the Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; (b) the Dutch gov-
ernment applied these provisions in compliance with Article 2(1) of 
the Covenant that obligates State Parties only to undertake “steps […] 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights”; (c) the process aimed 
at achieving progressively the full realization of the rights was well 
under way and discriminatory provisions were gradually being elimi-
nated from legislation; (d) the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights put in place its own system of monitoring 
and the Netherlands periodically submitted the required reports. 
What follows is the commentary submitted by the author of the ap-
plication. The preambles to both Covenants stress a close connection 
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and relationship between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and 
social and economic ones, on the other. The fact that these two catego-
ries of rights are guaranteed by separate international instruments does 
not weaken these connections. Article 26 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, laying down the overall principle of equal-
ity before the law, does not relate it—unlike Article 2(1)—to the rights 
provided for in the Covenant. Furthermore, the Dutch legislator, in the 
grounds attached to its ratification resolution maintained that “the pro-
visions of Article 26 are applied also in areas not covered by the Cov-
enant”. When the Human Rights Committee was discussing a periodical 
report submitted by the Netherlands, the Dutch representative said that 
Article 26 of the Covenant was also applicable to economic, social and 
cultural rights. In the light of this statement of the government represen-
tative, all that could be debatable was the question of direct application 
of Article 26 by the courts. It is also worth mentioning that the author 
of the application, arguing in favour of a close connection between the 
two categories of human rights, invoked not only the preambles to both 
Covenants, but also a 1950 resolution of the UN General Assembly that 
had outlined the main principles of the future Covenants. 
The Committee held that equal treatment in the area of social rights 
did not differ at all from equal treatment in the area of civil and politi-
cal rights, and that a different interpretation would make Article 26 of 
the Covenant an idle declaration. Consequently, finding that the varying 
of benefits had no rational grounds, i.e. it was arbitrary, the Committee 
ruled that Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had 
been infringed.12 
In an analogous case, the Netherlands enhanced its arguments by 
claiming that the State was not obligated to eliminate all discrimi-
natory provisions from its national law. It was maintained that time 
was necessary to perform a comprehensive analysis of legislation. 
12 Cf. S.W.M. Broeks v. the Netherlands, Application no. 172/1984, Rapport du Comité des 
Droits de l’Homme, Assemblée Générale, Documents Officiels, 1987.
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Moreover, changes in morals, ethical standards and public policies 
may make certain distinctions, once acceptable, look discriminatory. 
The author of the application invoked in her submissions the state-
ment by the Dutch government submitted at the ratification of the Cov-
enant. In it, it was maintained that the period of legislation adjustment 
did not apply to the norms that could be directly applied. One of them, 
unsurprisingly, is the norm laid down in Article 26 of the Covenant, 
which is borne out by the practice of the Dutch courts followed hither-
to. The Committee expressed the view that Article 26 of the Covenant 
had been violated, because the distinction drawn between women and 
men in their entitlement to an unemployment benefit was unreasonable 
and irrational.13 
It transpired that the Committee found that the distinctions made 
in social insurance benefits were not discriminatory, as for instance be-
tween spouses and unmarried persons cohabiting together.14 Important-
ly, however, the Committee did not find such applications to be inadmis-
sible ratione materiae. 
The pretext for filing applications in the cases cited above was, ad-
mittedly, the protection of the principle of equality before the law, but 
the result of the monitoring procedure was the restoration of social and 
economic rights to an individual. What is more, the State announced 
that it would make amendments to its national legislation. One can won-
der if these precedents related to Article 9 of the Covenant on Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights open the door to the procedure before 
the Human Rights Committee for protecting other rights provided for 
in the Covenant. This is even more likely as in connection with the prin-
ciple of equality before the law, the authors of the applications invoked 
other rights as well. In none of these cases, however, did the Committee 
cite the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or other 
13 F. G. Zween-de Vries v. the Netherlands, Application no. 182/1984, Rapport du Comité des 
Droits de l’Homme, Assemblée Générale, Documents Officiels, 1987.
14 L. G. Danning v. the Netherlands, Application no. 180/1984, Rapport du Comité des Droits 
de l’Homme, Assemblée Générale, Documents Officiels, 1987.
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treaties for that matter. It did so for the first time in the case referred to 
below. 
Several Canadian public employees filed an application, claiming 
a breach of the Article 22 of the Covenant (freedom of association). 
They alleged that the statutory prohibition of a strike by public employ-
ees contravened the provision in question. The alleged victims of the 
statute, which imposed penalties for participating in a strike, were—in 
the opinion of the application authors—members of the trade union of 
public employees. 
Several years earlier, the trade union of which the application 
authors were members, had lodged a complaint with the Committee 
on Freedom of Association of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), alleging that the statutory prohibition breached ILO Conven-
tion no. 87 since “it constituted a considerable restriction on the op-
portunities open to trade unions to further and defend the interests of 
their members”. The Committee on Freedom of Association suggest-
ed that the legislation in question be amended and the prohibition of 
strike be confined only to “essential services”. The trade union lodged 
complaints twice with the ILO in later years, because the legislation 
had not been amended. 
In the proceedings before the Human Rights Committee, the State 
raised in the first place the allegation of inadmissibility of a ratione ma-
teriae application. The Canadian government took the stance that Ar-
ticle 22(1) of the Covenant—which enacts the right for everyone “to 
form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests”—did not 
guarantee the right to strike. A State party is only obliged to permit and 
make possible trade-union action. However, in giving effect to this obli-
gation, a State party is free to choose the means that it considers appro-
priate. Interestingly enough, the Canadian government cited the Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 8(1)(d), which 
provides for the right to strike but used this provision as an argument for 
the inadmissibility of a ratione materiae application. 
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In their commentary to the statement by the State, the application 
authors invoked Article 22(3) of the Covenant, which says:
Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International 
Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning freedom of associa-
tion and protection of the right to organize to take legislative measures 
which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to preju-
dice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.
The Committee, considering the admissibility of the application, 
in the first place posed the question of whether Article 22 of the Cov-
enant guaranteed the right to strike. This was its line of reasoning: 
since the right to strike is not guaranteed expressis verbis, the inter-
pretation of this provision should answer the question of whether the 
right to form trade unions implies the right to strike. The Committee 
admitted that on the grounds of the ILO Convention and the deci-
sion of the Committee on Freedom of Association quoted above, the 
right to form trade unions implied the right to strike. The Committee 
continued:
The Human Rights Committee has no qualms about accepting as cor-
rect and just the interpretation of those treaties by the organs concerned. 
However, each international treaty, including the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, has a life of its own and must be interpreted 
in a fair and just manner, if so provided, by the body entrusted with the 
monitoring of its provisions.
The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides for 
the right to form trade unions and the right to strike (Article 8). Having 
analysed in detail the drafting of both Covenants, the Committee con-
cluded that the drafters of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
had consciously and purposefully left out the right to strike from its Ar-
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ticle 22. Consequently, it decided that the application was inadmissible 
ratione materiae.15 
As many as five Committee members signed an individual opinion. 
They believed that the intentions of the drafters of the provisions of both 
Covenants under discussion were not absolutely clear. In favour of the 
admissibility of the application, they offered two main arguments. First, 
to further and defend trade-union member interests, various means are 
used, none of which is listed in Article 22 of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Hence, any means similar to a strike could be ques-
tioned. Second, there are no reasons to interpret the right to form trade 
unions, provided for in both Covenants, differently. Nor are there any 
reasons for the Committee to understand the right to form trade unions 
differently than the International Labour Organization does, especially 
in the light of Article 22(3) of the Covenant quoted above. 
The line of reasoning presented in the individual opinion merits 
complete approval. The Committee based its decision on a formal-dog-
matic interpretation of Article 22 of the Covenant, while it should have 
adopted a teleological interpretation. Social and economic rights are 
taken into consideration in the General Comments when they discuss, 
for instance, State obligations in relation to the reduction of infant mor-
tality rate or the elimination of hunger and malnutrition, etc. 
The Committee has invoked other international instruments when con-
sidering reports, for instance, the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (in relation to Ar-
ticle 7 of the Covenant) and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners (in relation to Articles 7 & 10). Hence, there are no rea-
sons for ignoring other treaties when considering individual applications. 
The conception of autonomy of treaty terms vis-à-vis the national law 
of State parties is understandable and necessary. An international body must 
apply a “supranational” interpretation in the name of the universal nature of 
15 J. B. et al. v. Canada, Application no. 118/1982, Rapport du Comité des Droits de l’Homme, 
Assemblée Générale, Documents Officiels, 1986.
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human rights, which may have a regional or global dimension. The segrega-
tion, in turn, of human rights by the international instrument in which they 
are provided for is artificial and incompatible with the idea of the indivisi-
bility of all human rights. Finally, this author believes that the autonomy of 
a treaty from other international instruments is a misguided legal construct. 
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